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Abstract
This thesis aims to shed some light on what challenges Brazil faces concerning its
oil reserves. It also considers Statoil’s situation and attempts to analyse the chal-
lenges both face. Hotelling’s rule and Dunning’s OLI framework are presented
and used in order to complete this analysis.
The thesis starts by looking at the history of petroleum in Brazil and Norway.
Next, the theoretical framework is outlined.
The challenges for both Brazil and Statoil are presented and analysed through the
use of the theories presented. Finally, some future prospects are outlined.
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some hard-to-find, and sometimes quite obscure, books.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is an attempt to look at the opportunities and challenges surrounding
the newfound petroleum resources in Brazil, and the opportunities this presents
for the country and Statoil. My research has been focused on the historical de-
velopment of the petroleum sector in Brazil, and the future challenges. I also
introduce Statoil, and attempt to discover whether Statoil has a future in Brazil,
and whether Statoil’s involvement will be good for the country. By looking at the
challenges faced by both Brazil and Statoil, I try to discover if the two are a good
match. My research questions can tentatively be summed up as:
1. What challenges does Brazil face in its newfound petroleum
wealth, how can those be resolved?
2. Is Statoil a good match for Brazil and vice versa, and what ad-
vantages does the company have in the country?
Chapter 2 provides some background information. It starts with Section 2.1, gives
an overview over the history of petrolum in Brazil, from 1930 and onwards. It
also gives an overview of the regulatory framework in existence today. This is
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important, because it gives an introduction to how petroleum has been viewed in
Brazil, and how the changes have been made.
In Section 2.2 I give a short overview of the beginnings of the Norwegian petroluem
history and the foundation and evolution of Statoil. This is important to be able to
review Statoil’s role today.
In chapter 3 I present the theoretical foundations. Section 3.1 is about FDI, and
Dunning’s OLI-framework especially. In order to analyse Statoil’s FDI, this is
important. I also present some of the host country effects of FDI. Section 3.2
is about resource extraction and its taxation. First I present Hotelling’s rule, its
implications for price formation and extraction, and some criticism of it. Second,
argue why natural resources should be taxed specifically and I present different
alternatives for taxation, and the resource rent tax.
In chapter 4 I outline Brazil’s and Statoil’s future challenges. In section 4.1 I show
what challenges further petroleum extraction may present for Brazil, with special
emphasis on the effects petroleum extraction has on corruption and growth. Sec-
tion 4.2 is about Statoil’s challenge; that the Norwegian continental shelf is run-
ning out of oil, and that it’s continued existence depends on increasing activities
outside Norway.
In section 4.3 I tentatively conclude that:
1. The resolution to the challenges imposed by the resource wealth
is probably best met by continuing the positive development in
government. This however depends on the institutions being
able to counteract the negative impact of the oil industry.
2. Brazil, with its vast fields is a good place for Statoil to continue
its operations.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 History of Petroleum in Brazil
Brazil was discovered by Portuguese explorers in 1500, although some speculate
that Portuguese fisherman had landed there earlier. The new colony was named
after the first valuable resource the colonisers found there, Brasil-wood, used in
red colouring dye. The country was a colony until 1822, although the last years
nominally as an equal partner with Portugal after the Portuguese court fled due to
the Napoleonic wars. It was a monarchy until 1889, when a military coup ended
the empire and instituted the Old Republic. The constitution of 1891 did little
to change the social structures in the country, and especially in the old colonised
regions in the Northeast, a handful of families in each state controlled most of the
land. The First Republic, also dubbed the Velha Repu´blica, the Old Republic, was
dominated by oligarchies in the biggest and richest states, Sa˜o Paulo and Minas
Gerais. The constitution, although nominally democratic, only extended suffrage
to men over the age of 21 who were literate. 85 % of the population was illiterate
3
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at the time.1
2.1.1 The Vargas regime (1930-45)
The Brazilian petroleum history has its first beginnings in the Constitution of
1934. Following the coup in 1930 which ended the Old Republic, Getu´lio Vargas
was made president of the republic. After the cafe´-com-leite system broke down,
in which the landed oligarchies in Minas Gerais and Sa˜o Paulo shared power, Var-
gas envisioned more modern Brazil.2 A Constituent Assembly was formed, and
in 1934 they declared a new constitution. Ownership of subsoil resources, such as
oil and minerals, was to be national, under the ownership of the Federal Union.3
The coalition that brought Vargas to power, although not a homogeneous faction
by any metric, wanted to bring an end to the old system, and economic and in-
dustrial development was important for the construction of the modern Brazilian
state. The state was to be an important instrument in this modernisation of the
economy.4 However, oil was at the time of Vargas’ ascent to power in 1930, not a
big issue. Oil consumption was low, less than a third of Argentina’s, and it made
up less than 10 % of the import bill.5
The military, however, had long held the view that oil was a strategically vital
resource. Already in the 1920s most officers saw “state intervention in the sector
and nationalisation of reserves” as necessary.6 Following Sa˜o Paulo’s defeat in the
short-lived 1932 civil war and the establishment of the authoritarian Estado Novo
1Bethell (2008b, p.5)
2Cafe´-com-leite literally means coffee with milk, a reference to the landed oligarchies in Sa˜o
Paulo and Minas Gerais, who produced coffee and were cattle ranchers, respectively.
3Bethell (2008b, p.32). The term Federal union is used interchangeably with the federal gov-
ernment.
4Bethell (2008b, p.10)
5Philip (1982, p.227)
6Philip (1982, p.229) and Cohn (1968, p.46)
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in 1937, Vargas was ever more dependant on the military to hold on to power. Var-
gas himself lamented the 1934 Constitution, which ended the dictatorship, which
he saw as instrumental to building a modern nation. It also imposed term limits
on the presidency and Vargas would have to resign in 1938 had the coup not taken
place.
Throughout the 1930s, oil consumption in Brazil increased at an annual rate of
19.55 %, and oil’s importance in the national economy increased.
A secret committee set up after the establishment of the Estado Novo, led by the
previous director of the Servic¸o Geolo´gico Fleury da Rocha, recommended that a
national oil agency, Conselho Nacional de Petro´leo (CNP), be set up with exten-
sive powers over the sector. The committee was held a secret, according to Wirth
(1970), so that the government could push through its legislation before any op-
position to the proposition could be mounted. Existing private assets remained
in private hands, however, and the state was not given a monopoly over explo-
ration. Explorers should however be Brazilian companies with Brazilian owners.7
Foreign capital was excluded from refining.
Opposition to state control over the sector was led by the so-called entrepreneurs,
although Philip (1982) maintains that their skills were more in publicity rather
than oil exploration. Even so, the charges levelled against the bureaucracy and
the international oil companies were quite serious, as evidenced by Monteiro Lo-
bato’s O escaˆndalo do Petro´leo (1936), and his letters to president Vargas.8 He
maintains that the Servic¸o Geolo´gico, precursor to the CNP, under the leadership
of the “foolish and innocent eye” of Fleury da Rocha, was being infiltrated by the
“tentacles of the octopus that infiltrates Brazil” that is Standard Oil.9 He main-
7de Paiva Abreu (2008, p.314)
8Monteiro Lobato (1936)
9Monteiro Lobato (1935)
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tains that the state bureaucracy colludes with international oil companies to leave
proven reserves in the ground, in order to enrich the aforementioned companies.
Hence, oil exploration must be taken out of the government bureaucracy’s hands.
Although a government investigation found that the accusations had no basis in
reality, Standard Oil’s involvement in the Chaco war showed their capability in
manipulating governments for their own ends.10
General Horta Barbosa was charged with leading the CNP from its inception. A
military man, apolitical, he too saw oil as a vital resource. With prospects for war
in Europe, and even conflict with Argentina, the CNP was more an “answer to a
security problem rather than [. . . ] an approach to a longer term strategy”.11 Al-
though not prohibited by the legislation creating the CNP, Horta blocked any fur-
ther expansion and new-building of private refineries, many of which had reached
preliminary stages. After trips to Uruguay and Argentina in 1939, and meetings
with Mosconi of Argentina’s YPF, Horta Barbosa believed they would limit the
federal government’s ability to regulate the industry.12 Vargas did not however,
declare refining a national monopoly, as not to interfere with his other develop-
ment plans, which depended on US support.13 Specifically, there were plans to set
up a steel mill in Volta Redonda, midway between the cities of Sa˜o Paulo and Rio
de Janeiro.
As early as in 1939 was oil discovered in the state of Bahı´a, and further explo-
ration in the state was reserved for the CNP. However, by 1945 oil production was
10Wirth (1970) goes further, and explicitly states that Monteiro Lobato’s intentions were to
enrich himself by making his own stocks more valuable. The Chaco war (1932–35) was fought
between Bolivia and Paraguay, and the belligerents disputed control over Gran Chaco. The region
was thought to be rich in oil, and Standard oil backed Bolivia in the war. The conflict itself was
the bloodiest in South America in the 20th century, with 100,000 casualties.
11Philip (1982, p.230)
12Yacimientos Petrolı´feros Fiscales, Fiscal Petroleum Fields, the Argentinean state oil com-
pany.Bjørnstad (2000, p.38)
13Philip (1982, p.233)
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 7
negligible, and there were no major refineries in the country.
2.1.2 The Petrobra´s era
The creation of Petrobra´s
During the end of World War II, the United States ended its support for the Vargas
regime and the Estado Novo. With a military coup in October 1945, and a new
liberal constitution in 1946, coupled with Horta Barbosa’s resignation from CNP
in 1943, the stage seemed set for a more liberal oil regime. Colonel Barreto,
Horta Barbosa’s successor in CNP, allowed private capital in the refineries, and
wanted involvement from at least US companies in the petroleum sector, if not
other foreign companies as well.
General Dutra, elected president after the overthrow of Vargas, supported this
path, and allowed two private Brazilian firms to establish refineries in 1946. The
question of foreign capital in the exploration and refining had to be addressed by
the legislature, however.
In 1947 Dutra established a new committee to decide, again, what Brazilian oil
policy should be. The project was then handed over to CNP to propose a new
petroleum statute. CNP favoured a concession model like the one in Venezuela,
in which private companies would obtain concessions for subsoil resources, but
the Federal Union remain the sole owner.14 Foreign companies would be allowed
entry as well, and the concession model was at least in part suggested in order to
attract foreign investment.
General Horta Barbosa continued his campaign for a national oil monopoly, even
14Bjørnstad (2000, p.40)
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Figure 2.1: Communist leaflet from the ”O Petro´leo e´ nosso” campaign. The
term entreguismo loosely means to give away or allow foreign capital to exploit a
country’s natural resources. The names on the leaflet are amongst others central
figures supporting Vargas. (dos Santos, 2006)
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though he did not believe the state to be a good industrialist. However, since he
regarded oil as such an important resource, having a state monopoly would be
the only way to secure it. This position was also the solution of choice amongst
officers in the army.15 An unlikely alliance of communists, army officers and the
urban middle class effectively killed the bill proposed by CNP, and when it was
presented to the Congress, it was without the President’s support. The communists
started a campaign, known as O Petro´leo e´ Nosso, literally “The Petroleum is
ours”, which gained support amongst the aforementioned groups.16
Another department, DASP, rival to CNP and headed by an ally of Horta Barbosa,
proposed to build a new refinery, expand an existing one and acquire a number of
tankers in order to solve more pressing supply issues.17 Even though DASP started
out strictly as a budgetary organ, the plan won Congress’ approval in 1948, and
laid the oil issue dead for a few years. No new legislation had passed concerning
how the industry as a whole should be organised and regulated.
Vargas returned to power in the 1950 elections. The oil question had been a con-
tentious one, and Vargas wanted to settle it once and for all. Congress was con-
trolled by conservative forces, which were normally pro free-enterprise. Commu-
nists, who had received great support because of the oil matter, were unlikely to
agree to any other settlement than complete state control over the oil industry.
PTB, the Brazilian Workers’ Party, proposed before congress a complete state
monopoly over the petroleum sector. In order to get support from the conservative
deputies, Vargas suggested the government set up a holding company, 51 % owned
15Philip (1982, p.234)
16Bjørnstad (2000) argues that it was a popular movement, however, when the movement took
place, only about 25-30 % of the adult population were registered to vote, and a slightly smaller
percentage did vote.
17Departamento Administrativo do Servic¸o Pu´blico, DASP, was principally responsible for the
federal budget, and finding ways to improve public services.
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by the federal government. It would raise capital by transferring existing CNP
assets, selling 49 % to private investors and the government would raise funds
through new excise taxes on certain luxury products. There were a few misgivings
to such a plan. Some believed that Brazilian capitalists lacked the capital and
competence to set up a domestic petroleum industry. To others, such as Horta
Barbosa, private capital would act as Trojan horse for foreign interests.
To Vargas’ surprise, conservative deputies declared support for the PTB plan.
Eventually, it would pass, giving the state through Petrobra´s complete monopoly
over exploration, extraction and refining, bar the two pre-existing private refiner-
ies. They would be allowed to continue, but not expand operations. Later, under
President Goulart, it was suggested that the government should nationalise these
as well, but this was not done.
The bill itself passed as law no. 2.004 October 3rd 1953, and Vargas said after
having signed it
Congress has turned into law the government plan for exploitation of
our petroleum. Petrobra´s will secure not only the development of the
national oil industry, it will also limit the evasion of our borders. In-
corporated with exclusively Brazilian capital, technology and labour,
Petrobra´s is the result of a firm nationalist economic policy [. . . ].
It is then with satisfaction and patriotic pride I today sanctioned the
letter of the law, passed by the legislative body, that constitutes a new
mark in our economic independence.18
–Getu´lio Vargas
Petro´leo Brasileiro S.A, Petrobra´s, formally began operations in 1954, on May
18Petrobra´s (2009)
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10th, taking over existing CNP assets, including the refineries set up by DASP. The
refineries, located in Mataripe, Bahı´a and Cubata˜o outside Santos in Sa˜o Paulo,
refined 2,663 barrels of oil, or 1.7 % of domestic consumption.19
President Vargas’ words clearly state what the company’s mission was – acquire
economic independence for Brazil through self-sufficiency in petroleum products,
even though he was not initially supportive of a wholly owned state-monopoly.20
In a more global context, Petrobra´s was created at a time when belief in govern-
ments’ ability to run industry efficiently was high, and sometimes necessary to
build industry when private capital was lacking. It was also widely held that state
ownership could provide protection against unfortunate external shocks.21
In other developing countries, other state-owned enterprises were funded in sec-
tors deemed to be of strategic importance. Hindustan Machine Tools in India was
given effective monopoly of 17 sectors in the economy following its establishment
in 1956. HMT has since experienced a massive overstaffing, due to the govern-
ment’s use of the enterprise as a tool for job-creation. Semen Gresik of Indonesia
was established after the discovery of large limestone deposits in the country. In
Turkey, Sumerbank, later Sumer Holding, was established in 1933 to facilitate and
promote industrialisation in the country.
In Italy, the organisation established to preserve the banking sector after the 1929
depression was seen as an important player in rebuilding the country after the
Second World War. Istituto per la recostruzione industriale (IRI) was not as locked
in its operations as other SOEs; it was governed largely as a private enterprise
19Petrobra´s (2009)
20Vargas would later in 1954 commit suicide, and in his suicide letter (Vargas, 1954), he accuses
the “forces against Brazilian independence” of working against him and effectively forcing him to
kill himself.
21Muir and Saba (1995, p.11). The following paragraphs are also based on Muir and Saba
(1995)
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Average annual change
Period Consumption Production
1955–1959 18.49 % 63.36 %
1960–1964 11.07 % 2.38 %
1965–1969 9.57 % 13.25 %
1970–1974 11.15 % 1.55 %
1975–1979 5.04 % -0.75 %
1980–1984 1.38 % 21.36 %
Table 2.1: Growth in production and consumption, 1955-84. Source: Brazilian
oil production, consumption, imports 1942-1999 on page IV
until 1960, and did not receive any government support before that. The state was
also playing an increasing role in the British economy, although this began in the
aftermath of the First World War.
Against this backdrop of political fighting over the future of oil production in
Brazil, CNP did have some success in locating petroleum deposits. From 1945–55
proven reserves increased from 1 million to 35 million barrels. Furthermore, the
founding of Petrobra´s lessened the Brazilian dependency on importats of refined
petroleum products. The dependance on straight crude increase however — in
1953, crude imports were at 30,000 metric tons, whereas in 1955, the year after
the company was founded, crude imports were 3,513,000 metric tons.
Continued operations
The goal of achieving a self-sufficient Brazil in petroleum remained elusive. Through-
out the Kubitschek’s and Goulart’s presidencies, as well as the military regime
ending in 1985, domestic crude oil production never exceeded 43% of domestic
consumption. Domestic production did increase in the period, quite dramatically.
Crude consumption increased more however. Table 2.1 illustrates.
In 1961, Petrobra´s opened the first refinery built by the company, in Duque de
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Caxias outside Rio de Janeiro. The same year, offshore exploration began, on the
continental shelf. In this context, the continental shelf was defined as waters up to
two hundred metres deep. The exploration zone itself stretched from the state of
Espı´rito Santo to Maranha˜o.
The first offshore field was found in 1968, off the coast of Sergipe, in the North-
east.22 The development of the field was not decided on economic merit. Rather,
Petrobra´s decided to start production in order to gain offshore experience. As
such, the decision was a strategic one.
The oil crises of the seventies highlighted the need for domestic production, in the
eyes of the policymakers and Petrobra´s leaders at the time. The focus on offshore
explorations was increased. In 1974, discoveries were made in the Campos Basin,
outside the coast of northern Rio de Janeiro. A number of oilfields were discov-
ered in the following years in the basin, and made the Campos Basin the primary
petroleum producing region in Brazil.
This was not enough to cover domestic demand however, and in 1979, domestic
production covered less than 15 % of consumption, down from 31.5 % in 1970.
The regime was conscious of the import bill imposed by increased petroleum im-
ports and the price hikes caused by the oil crisis in 1973. It was these factors that
made the Brazilian government start the Pro-Alcoo´l programme.
The use of combustible ethanol as a light vehicle fuel made sense in Brazil, the
world’s biggest sugar producer. The early success of the programme vanished
once the oil price decreased in 1985 however, and ethanol only became a com-
mercially viable fuel source again after 2003 with the invention of flex-fuel en-
gines. This substitution of ethanol for petrol has made the goal of self-sufficiency
in petroleum more easily attainable, however and today around 50 % of Brazil’s
22See Map of Brazil
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Figure 2.2: Brazilian car production, by fuel. (Anfavea, 2009)
light vehicle fuel needs are covered through sugar-based automotive ethanol.
The same factors made the government open up for risk contracts — international
and domestic oil companies could search for oil within Brazil, but any finds had
to be handed over to Petrobra´s, agent for the federal government. Compensation
would be given in cash, not a share of production in any fields found.
In the 1980s, the authorities wanted more of the platform construction and so
forth be done domestically, and initiated a programme to achieve that. Previously,
Brazilian industry had been more of a bystander in this process. In 1984, the first
giant field was found in the Campos basin, the Albacora field. The second giant,
the Marlim field was found the next year. The same year, natural gas was found
in the Santos basin, and oil was found on land in the Potiguar basin. Those two
were the only discoveries yielded by the risk contract programme.23 The Campos
basin further yielded the Roncador and Marlim Sul giant fields.
23There is some conflicting information on this matter however. Norda˚s et al. (2003) state that
there were five commercially viable discoveries, but Petrobra´s (2003) cites only these two.
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Figure 2.3: Contribution to GDP, percentage points. (ANP, 2005)
2.1.3 Deregulation
After the somewhat peculiar return to civilian rule on March 15th, 1985, a new,
democratic constitution was approved in 1988.24 The new constitution maintained
the Federal Union’s ownership over subsoil resources, thus the transition to civil-
ian rule meant little for Petrobra´s.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, riding on a wave of popularity following the success
of his stabilisation programme, was elected president in 1994 and took office in
1995. He would be an unlikely candidate for implementing orthodox economic
measures, at least given his contributions to the dependista school of thought.
He did just that, as the Real programme was an example of. A “crack team” of
24I use the term peculiar because the president-elect, Tancredo Neves, fell ill the day before
inauguration, and his vice president, Jose´ Sarney was sworn in as interim president. Sarney had
until May 1984 been president of the pro military regime party. The first civilian president in 21
years was therefore a man with strong ties to the former regime.
In a recent ruling on whether the amnesty law granting amnesty for crimes committed under the
military regime, Supreme Court justice Lewandowski places part of the blame for the fall of the
military regime on the oil crises, which destabilised the national economy.
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economists determined a set of measures that would end inflation. Brazil had by
then however, a rather long list of attempts to solve the inflation problem through
more heterodox measures, all of which failed to highlight the need for fiscal ad-
justments.25 In the period from 1985 to 1994, Brazil had gone through no less than
six attempts at economic stabilisation. After the implementation of the Real pro-
gramme, the government divested itself from many enterprises in “non-sensitive
sectors”.26
In 1997, Petrobra´s’ monopoly on petroleum exploration and extraction ended.
Law no. 9478, signed on 6 August 1997 formally ended Petrobra´s’ monopoly.
In order to fulfil the constitutional requirements, a new agency, ANP, was set
up.27 It hands out concessions to explore for and extract petroleum on Brazilian
territory. In hindsight, the move looks to be successful, and the petroleum sector’s
share of GDP has risen rapidly after the liberalisation of the sector. The non-
Petrobras share is stable though — even though the sector has been liberalised,
most of the gains have been made by Petrobras. (See Figure 2.3) At the time,
Petrobra´s workers staged a strike against what they perceived as privatisation.
The government was succesful in winning the population’s support. By accusing
the Petrobra´s workers of being effectively part of a privileged labour aristocracy,
the strikers lost support quickly.28
Petrobra´s was also part privatised, and today the Federal Government owns 55.7 %
of the voting shares in the company. The company has two classes of shareholders,
and all state holdings in the company are in voting shares.
25For a simple outline on the various attempts at stabilisation, see Grung (2008).
26Grung (2008, p.23)
27Ageˆncia Nactional do Pe´troleo (ANP), National Petroleum Agency. The full name has since
been changed to Ageˆncia Nactional do Pe´troleo, Ga´s Natural e Biocombustiveis, and its responsi-
bilities also include natural gas and biofuels (ethanol).
28Bjørnstad (2000)
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Figure 2.4: Composition of petroleum sector GDP. (ANP, 2005)
Figure 2.4 provides more evidence that the deregulation of the petroleum sector
has been successful in developing the sector, and making sure that more fields
come online. Upstream petroleum activity has gone from a low of around 8.5 %
in 1998 to close to 40 % of value added in the oil industry, at the same time as the
petroleum sector’s share of GDP has increased. Success in this regard is defined as
higher domestic crude and natural gas production, which was part of the original
reasoning for founding Petrobra´s.
The same trends are visible if one looks at the production of crude. Production
shows a steep increase after the deregulation. Petrobra´s’ share of the petroleum
sector value added also increased after the deregulation. The reasons for this
may be numerous, but outsiders, such as the US government, have made harsh
criticisms against the way concessions are given — ANP has been accused of
giving the fields with best prospects to Petrobra´s.
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Nevertheless, big and important fields have been given to foreign companies. Sta-
toil is operator and developer of the Peregrino field, in the Campos basin. When
production starts in 2011, it is expected to produce 100,000 barrels a day.
In 2007, the pre-salt fields were discovered, and this puts Brazil in a completely
new situation. These fields are located in the Campos and Santos basins out-
side Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo respectively, and contain large amounts of oil.
Although oil production has increased markedly, and production now surpasses
domestic needs, the scale of these fields is enormous.
Upon announcing the discovery of the Tupi field in 2007, Petrobra´s estimated that
recoverable resources were around 5-8 billion barrels of oil equivalents. The di-
rector of ANP also announced in 2008 that the nearby Carioca field contained
around 33 billion barrels, which would make it the third largest field ever dis-
covered, and that largest field discovered in the last thirty years. This has not
been confirmed from either Petrobra´s or BG Group, which both hold licences in
the block that contains the field. Another field on the same block however, has
confirmed reserves of 1.5 to 2 billion barrels.
The giant pre-salt fields have necessitated new influx of capital into Petrobra´s.
Contrary to what would be done in the era of state ownership, the company has
announced a share issue worth USD 25 billion in 2010. This is the biggest share
issue in ten years in the West. The development costs for the ultra-deep fields are
estimated to be around 240 billion USD.
Taxation and regulatory framework
All the fields that are under concession today are subject to a signatory bonus,
royalties, special participation tax, land use fees and normal company taxes. The
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of special petroleum taxes 2000-07. (ANP, 2008)
signatory bonus is the amount the oil company agrees to pay for the concession,
which is decided through an auction.29 Royalties amount to 5-10 % of gross
production, depending on the field. Most of the royalties go to state and municipal
coffers, not the national government. The special participation tax depends on
field size, field age and whether the field is onshore, offshore shallow waters or
offshore deep waters.30 Deductions for costs are allowed. The revenue net of
deduction is subject to the tax, which varies between 0 and 35 %. Tax revenues
are divided between the Federal government (50 %), adjacent states (40 %) and
adjacent municipalities (10 %). Rio de Janeiro receives the biggest share of the
royalties and the special participation tax; a hefty 75 % of total decentralised taxes
are paid to Rio de Janeiro.31
That means that oil companies are subject to special taxes corresponding to those
29Ferriche (2009) provides a good overview over the application of auctions in the Brazilian oil
sector, albeit in Portuguese.
30Deep waters in this context means waters of more than 400 metres depth.
31U´ltimo Segundo (2010)
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Figure 2.6: Banner hanged on Christ the Redeemer, landmark of Rio de Janeiro.
The banner reads “In Rio [de Janeiro]’s defense against cowardice”. (Santiago,
2010)
detailed in section 3.2.2. The profit tax and royalties serve two purposes; royalties
means that some of the risk in a field is borne by the government, and the special
participation tax will capture a larger part of the resource rent.32 In this context,
risk can mean both financial risk, and political risk; specifically, that a country
may chose to expropriate an oil installation after the whole investment is made,
and a signatory bonus is paid. By placing some of the taxation in the production
phase, part of the political risk is reduced.
Law no. 5938/09, which is still under deliberation, stipulates that the royalties
should be transferred to all the states and municipalities in Brazil.33 The special
participation tax’ distribution is also subject to change if the Senate approves law
32Ferriche (2009, p.38 and p.41)
33The law has been approved in the Chamber of Deputies, and has been sent to the Senate for
approval. As of 22 Apr. 10, it has not been voted on by the Senate.
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no. 5938/09. The share given to each state or municipality should conform to the
share of taxes transferred from Federal government.34 The law has received broad
support, with the majority of opposition coming from Rio de Janeiro. Se´rgio
Cabral, governor of Rio de Janeiro state, has launched a massive PR-campaign
against the law. The state and municipal governments stand to lose some USD 4
billion in yearly revenue. Figure 2.5 illustrates how inequitably the tax revenues
are shared.
34The Federal government collects income taxes and taxes on industrialised products, and 22.5
% of that is handed back to the states and municipalities.
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2.2 Petroleum in Norway
Petroleum was first discovered off the coast of Norway in 1969. There was much
scepticism about the prospects for finding petroleum in the North Sea. On request
from the Norwegian Foreign ministry, the Norwegian Geological Society authored
in 1958 a now infamous letter. It stated that “the possibility of there being coal, oil
or sulphur on the continental shelf along the coast of Norway can be discarded”.35
The prospects for oil in the North Sea were first made apparent after the discovery
of the Groningen field in the Netherlands in 1959.
Unlike Brazil, Norway had to resolve border issues with its neighbours Denmark
and UK. The Norwegian government was unwilling to accept a limitation of the
continental shelf to waters under a set depth, and within a specific distance of the
coast. Rather, an accord building on the principle of a mid-line was wanted, that
is, a line equidistant from each country was to designate which country had the
rights to the resources underground. This was achieved rapidly, and no drilling
or extraction was allowed before the agreements with both Denmark and the UK
were in place.36
The sharing itself was most fortunate for Norway; the mid-line principle meant
that several large oil fields came within the Norwegian part of the North Sea.37
The Ekofisk field would have been Danish rather than Norwegian had the sector
35The letter does state that there have been no comprehensive surveys of the North Sea however,
and the authors apparently believed the Foreign Ministry’s request was only about near-coast areas.
There is also some belief that Erik Pontoppidan, 18th century professor and theologian, ”knew”
about the oil underneath the sea. In his work about the nature of Norway, he writes about the “fat
of the North Sea”, which has later been interpreted to mean hydrocarbons. Even Kindingstad and
Hagemann (2002) refer to this. Jahren and Bjørlykke (2005) refute this misconception thoroughly.
36There were also attempts to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union from 1970 onwards,
but the question was only resolved in April 2010.
37According to Kindingstad and Hagemann (2002, p.30), Norwegian authorities succesfully
established that the outermost rocks in the sea formed the limits from which the mid-line should
be calculated.
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principle rather than the mid-line principle been followed. The oil question was
not a political one at first. At the onset, it was the civil service that was most
preoccupied with it. Jens Evensen was responsible for the deals outlining the
sharing of the North Sea, and with two fellow civil servants he captured national
interest for oil.
Philips Petroleum of Oklahoma was the company to first show interest for explo-
ration of Norwegian waters. In a letter dated 29 October 1962 they attempted to
obtain exclusive rights for exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in
the Norwegian parts of the North Sea. Their offer to the government in exchange
for this exclusivity was doing a survey of Norwegian territorial waters, costing
$ 160,000 per month and totalling to around $ 1,000,000. Their application, al-
though not answered for another few decades, was politely declined. Phillips’
interest for Norway was primarily a practical one. The Seven Sisters were given
preference in Great Britain and the Netherlands, and in Denmark the industrialist
A.P. Møller was given exclusive extraction rights, on both territorial waters and
under land.
The Norwegian civil service was decisive in the shaping of the regulatory regime.
In 1965 the first concessions round was held. A novel concept was established —
rather than requiring cash payments in exchange for concessions, the government
demanded that the blocks conceded be properly explored. That meant that all
the companies applying for concessions had to elaborate drilling and exploration
plans for any blocks conceded to them. Furthermore, if no drilling took place, 25
% of the block would return to the government. After another three years, the oil
company would lose another 25 %. The primary concern for the authorities was
to establish the scope and scale of any oil resources.
As a curious detail, there was apparently a meeting between oil executives in New
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York prior to the first concessions round, where they agreed that “any attempt to
unduly influence or bribe Norwegian authorities or their representatives would be
unwise”.38 Implicitly this is an admission that the big oil companies were party to
corruption elsewhere. Section 4.1.2 supports this.
When the first oil rig reached Norway in 1966, the Ministry for Industry took con-
trol over offshore safety, in order to ensure that inspection and regulatory respon-
sibility was not dealt with by the individual agencies responsible for explosives,
airspace, health and safety and so on. In total at least six different government
agencies would instead be consulted, with the Ministry for Industry as supervisor.
Phillips Petroleum would be the first company to discover a commercially viable
field on the Norwegian continental shelf. The Ministry for Industry was informed
of the discoveries on the day before Christmas in 1969. The Ekofisk field would
be a giant field, and today it is a National Industrial Heritage. The field entered
production two years later, in 1971.
Had it not been for the obligations that Phillips had taken on under the concessions
regime, Phillips might not have found the field however. The hole that showed
evidence of viable oil resources was the last that the company was obliged to
drill, and was only drilled because if had it not been, Phillips would be fined
$ 1,000,000. After the first finding, the rig manager sent a message Phillips’
Norwegian headquarters where he declared “the North Sea, from here to the North
Pole, is one big pool of oil”.39 Ekofisk is still in production today, almost 40 years
since it was first opened.
The parts civil service in charge of handling the oil question, headed by Jens
Evensen, regarded the oil business to be too risky for Norwegian companies to
38Kindingstad and Hagemann (2002, p.47)
39Kindingstad and Hagemann (2002, p.75)
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Figure 2.7: Oil and gas production from Ekofisk in million m3 oil equivalents,
1971-2009. (Oljedirektoratet, 2009)
take party to. Because of the great risk, and uncertainty of ever recouping the
costs, “oil was seen as something the Americans dealt with”.40 The contrast to the
views of the Brazilian army and civil service is sharp.
Opinions since changed, and the government of the time, a centre-right coalition
headed by Borten, wanted Norsk Hydro to be the Norwegian financial and in-
dustrial instrument. The company was at the time the biggest in Norway, and
it had international experience and some international owners. Additionally, the
company consumed around 12 % of all oil in Norway. The government started
a secret buying spree in the company, and wound up with a majority of the vot-
ing shares. Only after the transaction was made public did the government seek
funds in Stortinget to finance the deal. Stortinget approved the purchases, but al-
sodecided that the state’s ownership in Norsk Hydro did not bind it in any way,
meaning that the possibility for establishing a wholly owned national company
40Kindingstad and Hagemann (2002, pp.82–83)
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was still present. Borten’s attempt to pre-empt a successive Labour government
from establishing a national oil company was thus unsuccessful.
During the winter of 1971 Borten resigned and a new Labour government was
formed. It decided that a new state-owned company should be formed for manag-
ing the state’s business interests, called Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS, Statoil.
Also in other oil producing countries, there was a tendency to establish new, state
companies in charge of oil exploration and extraction.
Furthermore, it was decided that all oil should be landed in Norway, which was
not obvious due to the proximity to other nations with oil handling facilities.
Exceptions could be made in case economic considerations demanded it. The
state-owned oil company was largely a Labour project, and the first CEO of the
company was a Labour member. After the first oil findings, the Norwegian gov-
ernment realised that the blocks were worth more than initially thought, and for
the next round of concessions it obtained higher tax rates from some of the oil
companies, and Phillips even agreed to carried interest, which would allow the
government to participate in exploration and extraction, without taking any risk.
The border with Britain also presented some challenges. In 1972 the Brent field
was discovered, and showed indications that it would stretch from British sec-
tor into Norwegian waters. The concessionaries on British side, Shell and Esso,
wanted concessions into Norway as well. Dividing the Norwegian blocks be-
tween these two companies was denied for two reasons: first of all, this would
give incentives to inflate the share of the petroleum reported to be in Britain, since
regulations there were laxer and taxes lower.41 The second consideration was to
await the establishment of Statoil, the aforementioned state company. Statoil was
awarded a 50 % share of the blocks on Norwegian side.
41See section 3.1.2 about profit shifting.
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Later on, it was discovered that the Brent field had little extension into Norway.
Instead, the Statfjord field was found on the same blocks. Chevron was the first
choice for operator of the blocks, but the company’s management did not approve
of the conditions placed on it: 50 % Statoil share, and a later relinquishing of the
operator status to Statoil. Chevron believed it could negotiate a better agreement,
and did not respond the authorities within the deadline.42 The Norwegian gov-
ernment subsequently chose Mobil as operator, which Chevron discovered only
through the media. Mobil on its hand did not believe Statoil would be ready to be-
come operator of such a large field within 1984, the agreed upon year for Statoil’s
takeover.43
Statoil’s role has since changed. Initially, it was the government’s prime instru-
ment for dealing with the oil industry. The right wing of Norwegian politics was
worried about Statoil; that Statoil was becoming a too big player in the Norwe-
gian economy and the company was too young to administer a great portion of
the State’s revenues. In 1985 after a compromise between the Labour party and
the ruling coalition led by the Conservatives, Statoil’s operations were split in two
— one part continued to be the company’s financial interest in production, and
one part became the State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI). The SDFI is a purely
financial interest, so Statoil would still cover the State’s industrial involvement.
Furthermore, Statoil administered the SDFI for the government, since the civil
service had no prior experience in and lacked the competency to manage financial
assets.
The government had wanted to use the petroleum industry to maintain employ-
ment in declining regions, and the on-shore operations of Statoil were spread
42Kindingstad and Hagemann (2002, p.96)
43Kindingstad and Hagemann (2002, p.96). Mobil stated that it would take 25 years for Statoil
to be ready, to which Arve Johnsen, first CEO of Statoil, reportedly responded “you’ve come to an
industrialised country now, not a third world country”.
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throughout the coast. Following the oil price crash in 1986, when Saudi-Arabia
ended its role as a swing producer in OPEC and price guarantor in international
markets, the commercial objectives were given larger weight. The government’s
involvement was diminished and commercial objectives became the main focus.
Until the end of the 1990s, it was the government’s policy to allow and rely on
three Norwegian oil companies:
1. Statoil: wholly owned state enterprise, with focus on the petroleum industry.
2. Norsk Hydro: partly state owned and listed enterprise, whose main busi-
nesses were aluminium, oil and fertilizers.
3. Saga Petroleum: publicly listed and privately owned company. The Norwe-
gian government had no financial interests in the company.
This policy has since changed. Firstly when Saga Petroleum came into financial
distress and was taken over by Norsk Hydro and Statoil. Norsk Hydro and Statoil
bought half of the shares each. The then director of Saga protested this devel-
opment by selling his shares to French ELF at a lower price than Norsk Hydro’s
and Statoil’s offer. Subsequently Norsk Hydro was restructured. The company’s
petroleum division was sold off to then partly privatised Statoil ASA. The fertil-
izer division has become Yara, and Norsk Hydro now only deals in aluminium.44
In 2001, Statoil was partly privatised. Since Statoil was still in charge of managing
the SDFI, a new state owned company was established, whose sole function is to
manage the SDFI.
Still, even when it was a purely state owned enterprise, Statoil was well run, and
Muir and Saba (1995) argue that Statoil was the best run state owned company at
44Norsk Hydro is involved in Brazil as well, and increasingly so following its takeover of Vale’s
aluminium assets.
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the time.
Chapter 3
Theoretical framework
3.1 Foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as a long-term investment in a com-
pany in another country with the objective to influence management. This puts it
at odds with portfolio investments, which are short term in nature, and take place
to earn a return on the investment without trying to change how the firm is run.
According to the OECD, “the direct or indirect ownership of 10 % or more of
the voting power of an enterprise resident in one economy by an investor resident
in another economy is evidence of such a relationship”.1 However, ownership
shares of that magnitude are not controlling, and influence over management may
be limited. The corporate ownership structure in the recipient country is decisive
for whether this is controlling or not. For instance, a 10 % share in a country with
little or no protection for minority shareholders is next to useless in terms of con-
trolling or influencing a company, whereas owning 10 % of a listed US company
1OECD (2007, p.7)
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Figure 3.1: Greenfield as % of total FDI. (UNCTAD)
is practically a controlling stake, due to the fragmented ownership in the country.2
The OECD does not allow divergence from this threshold though, for statistical
purposes — if different agencies use different metrics for what constitutes FDI,
the figures will no longer be comparable. It should be noted though that the 10 %
is for statistical purposes, and is not necessarily indicative of control.
FDI can take two forms, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and Greenfield invest-
ments. M&A means that an investor acquires a stake in an already existing pro-
ductive asset. Greenfield investment refers to an investment where a new produc-
tive asset is set up. M&A is by far the most important form of FDI for advanced
economies, whereas Greenfield investments dominate for developing economies.
(See Figure 3.1 and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004a, p.9)).
In addition, FDI can be split into two main types, vertical and horizontal FDI. Ver-
2The definition does not take share types into account either. If a company is divided between
voting and preferential shares, an investor could hypothetically control the company holding one
percent of the total equity, but more than 50 % of the voting shares.
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tical FDI exploits differences in factor costs across countries, where the company
splits production into various parts. The classic illustration of vertical FDI is the
maquiladora industry in Mexico, which assembles American cars. The stylized
example splits the production in to two parts, design and assembly of the car. De-
sign, which is intensive in its use of human capital, is located in the US, which is
abundant in human capital. The assembly, intensive in its use of unskilled labour,
takes place in Mexico, where it is abundant.3 This kind of vertical FDI depends on
low trade-costs between the locations where production occurs. This means that
tariffs and other barriers to trade restrict vertical FDI. Additionally, by splitting
production into several stages in discrete locations, the firm incurs splitting costs.
Depending on the nature of the firm these may be significant.
Horizontal FDI, also referred to as tariff-jumping FDI, gains access to markets
that are otherwise off-limits due to trade-restrictions, manmade or natural. In
essence, the firm duplicates its home-country production in the host economy.
The firm therefore foregoes some economies of scale to pursuit market access in
the country it invests in. However, some firm-specific activities are not duplicated,
e.g. R&D, which leads to firm level economies of scale. Contrary to vertical FDI,
higher barriers to trade encourage horizontal FDI. The size of the host economy is
also important, which is evidenced by the increase of inwards FDI in the EU after
the common market was created in 1992, in which there are no barriers to trade.
For example, Japanese companies established plants in the UK to serve the whole
EU, rather than producing at home.
Estimating how much FDI is vertical and how much is horizontal presents some
measurement issues, as there are few reporting requirements.
As this paper will focus on a multinational enterprise (MNE), it is useful to define
3Feenstra and Hanson (1997)
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what an MNE is. “MNEs are firms that own a significant equity share [. . . ] of
another company [. . . ] operating in a foreign country”.4 More precisely, a signif-
icant equity share would mean owning more than 50 % of the outstanding voting
stocks in said company.
3.1.1 OLI
The OLI model is a conceptual framework that identifies three factors that deter-
mine whether a company will engage in FDI or not. The model itself is based on
the assumption that FDI occurs due to market failures. “The basic proposition is
that market failure in intermediate product markets and the need for firms to ex-
ploit the economies of interdependent activities, lead them to replace the market
mechanism of cross-border transactions by internal hierarchies”.5
There must be some kind advantage to the firm contemplating FDI to actually do
it rather than producing at home and exporting, or buying imported components
off the shelf in the market. These three factors are:
1. Ownership advantage (O)
2. Localisation advantage (L)
3. Internalisation advantage (I)
Table 3.1 gives examples of what these advantages may be.
4Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004a, p.2)
5Dunning (1993, p.187)
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Ownership advantage
The multinational enterprise needs to have some advantage in owning the pro-
duction process. Examples of such advantages may be patents, human capital
or access to unique production processes. These assets can “take on the qual-
ity of public goods, that is, their marginal usage cost is zero or minimal”.6 An-
other ownership advantage may be due to corporate culture or the specific incen-
tive structures to the firm. As an example of this, Dunning and Lundan (2008,
p.132) reference the capitalists of the 19th century, who “created industrial em-
pires and communities [. . . ] which strongly reflected the values and beliefs of
their founders”.
For horizontal FDI, the enterprise must be competitive with local firms. These
advantages become especially important if the MNE has to overcome cultural or
linguistic barriers when locating abroad.
Localisation advantage
Localisation advantages mean that the MNE has advantages in conducting some
of its activities abroad rather than at home. The host economy has to present some
characteristics that make it profitable to locate there. One can look at three kinds
of localisation advantages, related to:
1. Market access
2. Efficiency gains
3. Natural resources
6Dunning (1993, p.191)
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Market access means that the MNE invests in the host economy to overcome trade
costs, tariffs or other barriers to trade. In essence, this is horizontal FDI. For
instance, Chinese owned textile industry in Lesotho can be seen as market seeking
FDI, not because Lesotho is or was a very attractive market, but because industry
located there had barrier-free access to markets in Europe and North America.
The disadvantage with this kind of inwards FDI, for the host country, is that it
depends on the proliferation on tariffs or other, non-tariff barriers to trade.
Advantages related to efficiency means that the MNE enters into production in the
host economy to take advantage of some kind of factor cost differential. Above-
mentioned is the maquiladora industry in Mexico. This kind of FDI is often de-
monised as outsourcing of domestic jobs, to places where labour conditions are
worse, and labour consequently cheaper. It is also blamed for the downfall of
good, secure and well-paying manufacturing jobs, especially in the US.7
Lastly, the advantage to natural resources is that the MNE has to locate the pro-
duction where the resource is, if not, there can be no production. Also, it may
be that the marginal production of said resource is cheapest in the host economy.
This needs not be the case though — most sources of natural resources cannot
be extracted immediately.8 That means that more than one source must be online
at all times to satisfy demand. The resource endowment of an economy is not a
static concept; it changes with two variables:
1. The technology available for extracting the resource.
2. Demand for said resource in the economy, or the technology available for
7Ross Perot’s “giant sucking sound south” is perhaps the most colourful incarnation of such
accusations. The phrase was used to describe what he thought the effects of NAFTA would be,
namely the offshoring of jobs to Mexico. (The New York Times, 1992)
8For petroleum, there is also an optimal rate of extraction due to the fact that it’s the under-
ground pressure that drives the petroleum up. If the petroleum is extracted too quickly, pressure
may be lost and total recoverable resources will be lower than necessary.
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making good use of the resource.
To use oil as an example, the modern era of petroleum is usually dated to 1859,
when oil was found in Pennsylvania in the US. Given the relatively shallow oil
wells, the oil seeped out of the ground after the well was struck. There was there-
fore no need to develop specific technologies to extract it. The other hand of the
equation, the demand for the oil, came for example through the use of paraffin in
street lights and oil lamps. Previously having been fuelled by whale oil, petroleum
came to substitute it and eventually led to the downfall of the once great US whal-
ing industry. 40 years ago, when the North Sea oil fields were being developed,
the ultra-deep fields in Brazil would not be feasible to develop, due to costs and
the lacking ability to extract petroleum so far under water.
Internalisation advantage
There must be some benefit to the MNE in entering into production itself, rather
than contracting in the market at arm’s length. The cost of internalisation has to be
measured against the cost of outsourcing production. Internalisation costs may be
investment cost in new facilities, inefficient scale in production and lack of market
knowledge. Outsourcing presents its own set of problems. No contract can cover
all possible contingencies. This can lead to hold-up problems, principal-agent
problems and dissipation of intangible assets.
Hold-up problems arise when the contracted firm under-invests in productive as-
sets. This happens because the firm fears that it might not be properly compen-
sated for its investment in these assets, e.g. the MNE might renege on its contract
and the firm, stuck with expensive assets that have little or no alternative use must
accept worse terms. In order to protect itself from this, the contracted firm per-
forms a sub-optimal investment.
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1. Ownership-specific advantages
(a) Property right and/or intangible asset advantages
(b) Advantages of common governance
i. which those branch plants of established enterprises may enjoy
over potential new firms
ii. which specifically arise because of multinationality
2. Internalisation-incentive advantages
(a) avoidance of search and negotiating costs
(b) to avoid costs of enforcing property rights
(c) buyer uncertainty about nature and value of inputs being sold
(d) to capture economies of interdependent activities
(e) to avoid or exploit government intervention
(f) to control supplies and conditions of sale of inputs
(g) to be able to engage in practices such as transfer pricing, cross-
subsidisation as a competitive strategy
3. Location-specific variables
(a) spacial distribution of natural and created resource endowments and
markets
(b) factor prices, quality and productivity
(c) transport and communications cost
(d) artificial barriers (tolls, quotas, etc.)
(e) economies of centralisation of R&D production and marketing
Table 3.1: Examples of OLI advantages. Adapted from Dunning (1993, p.198)
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When the MNE contracts an outside firm to undertake some part of production for
them, this invariably involves sharing some kind of firm specific asset, say, some
special manufacturing process. The contracted firm may then take this asset and
use it for its own, creating for the MNE not only a new competitor, but at the same
time eroding away at its competitive advantage by dissipating of intangible or firm
specific assets. The advantage related to internalisation is thus the elimination of
market failures.
3.1.2 Host country effects of foreign direct investment
It must be advantageous for the recipient country to allow for FDI, if not, it would
not. FDI can increase the total investments in the recipient country, and also
increase employment. This is, however, not the only ways FDI may impact a
recipient country. An investing company may use local subcontractors, and thus
create backward linkages in the economy. By making local companies facing
tougher demands, they may become more efficient, and all the local contractors’
customers benefit. That again implies that the total effects of FDI rather than
local investment may be better for the host economy. MNEs tend to pay higher
wages than local firms, and although they lay off workers faster than local firms,
their reactions are emphless severe in the sense of number of workers laid of for
instance.9 That is, “people who work in an MNE are less likely to be laid off, but
if it happens it happens fast”.10
UK data shows that multinationals are more productive than purely domestic
firms. This finding still holds, even when taking into account factors such as
capital employed, size of the company and other factors that may affect labour
9Barba Navaretti (2004, p.163 and p.170)
10Barba Navaretti (2004, p.170)
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productivity.11 The need for this distinction arises because MNEs tend to be big-
ger, employ more capital per employee and have more skilled employees than
other firms. Other studies investigating total factor productivity have similar find-
ings.12 Since these studies are based on data from developed countries, they cap-
ture mostly M&A FDI. There seems to be a slightly positive effect from being
taken over by a foreign enterprise, however this is still controversial and opposite
results have also been found. Whether acquisition by a foreign company affects
productivity, or if they acquire the most productive companies has thus not been
settled yet.13
Profit Shifting
MNEs have the opportunity to affect where they pay their taxes. Tax rates dif-
fer across countries, and sometimes even within countries. Companies that have
subsidiaries in different jurisdictions may try to shift profits to the location with
lowest taxes. This leads to higher after tax profits than what a purely domestic
company can achieve. That is, for a project with the same expected return before
taxes, the multinational may be able to extract a higher after tax return. A multi-
national enterprise will therefore also be less sensitive to tax increases in the host
country; a tax increase in the host economy will lead to higher profitability in the
home country.14
Profit shifting may take place through two mechanisms — abusive transfer pricing
and the use of internal debt. Abusive transfer pricing takes place in a transaction
between two subsidiaries of the same MNE, by selling intermediaries at a too
11Barba Navaretti (2004, p.158)
12Barba Navaretti (2004, p.160)
13Barba Navaretti (2004, p.161)
14Weichenrieder (2009)
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high or too low price. That is, the price is different from the “fair market price”.
Another manner of doing this is through license of franchise fees. Both of these
mechanisms allow the MNE can channel more of its profits into subsidiaries in
low tax locations.
Internal debt is used to shift profits by lending from a location where interest
income is taxed lightly, to a location where interest cost has a high tax deduction.
Internal debt in this scenario becomes a substitute for equity, because the debt
is owned by another entity in the same company. The equity however earns a
higher after-tax return due to the fact that interests are tax-deductible in the high-
tax jurisdiction, and the tax liability for interest income is transferred to a low-tax
location.
Profit shifting through transfer pricing is positively correlated with minority own-
ership, as the benefits for the MNE are even bigger when there are other owners
involved. On the other hand, the use of internal debt is negatively correlated with
minority ownership. The higher the share of minority ownership, the less benefit
for the multinational, and hence lower incidence of the use of internal debt.15
3.1.3 Foreign direct investment in Brazil
Several large, well-known MNEs are present in Brazil, and have been so for quite
some time. GM, for instance, recently celebrated its 85 year anniversary in the
country, and it possesses three manufacturing plants in the country.16 Others in-
clude Volkswagen, and other a multitude of other German companies. According
to the German Foreign Office, there are over 1,200 subsidiaries of German com-
panies in Brazil. 800 of them are located in Sao Paulo, and the city has “the largest
15Schindler and Schjelderup (2008)
16General Motors do Brasil (2009)
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Figure 3.2: FDI flows and stock for Brazil. (UNCTAD)
concentration of German businesses worldwide”, outside Germany.17 This con-
centration has earned the city one of its nicknames, the “most important German
industrial centre”.
Figure 3.2 places Brazil somewhere inbetween developed countries and develop-
ing countries in terms of how much FDI is Greenfield and M&A. Although the
shares are not stable, M&A accounts for between 50 % and 100 % in the period
the time series covers, and lies somewhere inbetween on average. This is in line
with expectations, given that Brazil is an economy in transition. As mentioned,
foreign enterprises have a large presence in the Brazilian market. A priori, one
would expect most FDI in Brazil to be tariff-jumping, because of two factors:
1. Long history of import substitution.
17Auswa¨rtiges Amt (2010)
42 CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2. High import tariffs on manufactured goods.
The two are intertwined however, and not independent from eachother. In addi-
tion, Brazilian workers are not especially cheap due to the regulatory regime and
hefty payroll taxes.Some put the difference between what is paid out and what
the workers receive at 26.8 %, and that number takes into consideration that some
of the payroll taxes may be paid back in case of dismissal.18 Nominally, this fee
alone is at 50 % of the salary. That makes vertical FDI to exploit factor price
differentials less likely.
FDI inflows are steadily increasing until the Argentinean crisis, and Lula’s elec-
tion, which both upset the markets. FDI in the 90s is more dominated by M&A
than laters years, perhaps due to the large wave of privatisations in that decade
following the stabilisation programme implemented by Fernando Henrique Car-
doso.
The state’s involvement in large sectors of the economy prior to the 1990s has also
served to decrease FDI in natural resource sectors. However, due to the deregu-
lation of the petroleum sector, amongst others, has led to an increase of foreign
holdings in that sector.
18Castro (2006)
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3.2 Resource extraction
3.2.1 Hotelling’s rule
The subject of extraction of finite resources appeared in Jevons (1866). He was
concerned with the availability of coal, whether it would be depleted and the sub-
sequent effects on the British economy. Since coal is finite, it cannot be used
indefinately for infinite growth, and he concludes that “We have to make the mo-
mentous choice between brief greatness and longer continued mediocrity”.19
Hotelling (1931) is seen by many as the starting point for the economic discus-
sion of finite natural resources.20 Hotelling’s rule shows that even if extraction
or production costs are zero, the price of a finite resource should be positive, and
increasing with the discount rate.21
Formally it is written:
p (t) = p0e
rt (3.1)
where p0 is the initial price, and p (t) is the price at t and r is the discount rate
for the period.22 Equation 3.1 is a continuously compounding version. One could
also write a discrete time equation:
p (t) = p0(1 + r)
t (3.2)
This equation only holds for a scenario of full certainty about the quantity of
petroleum in the ground, and perfectly competitive markets. It should also be
19Jevons (1866, p.376)
20Devarajan and Fisher (1981)
21Hotelling (1931)
22Hotelling (1931) uses γ, not r, in his paper, but normal notation today in finance would be
either r or k. I choose to use r.
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noted that this specification depends on the marginal cost of extraction being zero,
and in the presence of positive marginal costs, it implies that it is the rent that
should increase with the discount rate.23
The assumptions behind Hotelling’s rule do not hold in the case of petroleum
markets. There is much uncertainty about the resources left underground, and new
fields are discovered routinely.24 Additionally, it is not a perfectly competitive
market. It is a capital and skill intensive industry, and few companies have the
necessary capabilities to be players in it. OPEC attempts to restrict petroleum
output on a world basis. Although the amount of the world’s supply coming from
OPEC countries is shrinking, it is still a large share. There is some argument
surround their true power over the world’s energy markets, but the oil crises of
the seventies and the subsequent price crash in 1985 illustrated the low short term
price elasticity of demand and the short term impact the organisation can have.
Halvorsen and Smith (1991) attempt to test the validity of the rule using data
from the Canadian mining industry, and their results indicate that it is not valid.
However, they test on aggregate data, and do not take into consideration that the
knowledge on deposits may have changed during the period for which they test.
The authors note that the “the empirical results obtained here should be considered
as only tentative”.25 Chermak and Patrick (2001) however find that using data on
a single resource, Hotelling’s rule can “be useful in describing the behavior of an
individual producer”. By incorporating risk and uncertainty through the CAPM
model, Slade and Thille (1997) find some support for the theory.
23By rent is meant: Rent = p−MC
24Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest producer and most important exporter of oil, regards the
amount of reserves to be a state secret even.
In the North Sea, two companies assessed the area containing the Ula-field, finding nothing.
BP then started drilling, and BP geologists remarked that it was a “textbook example” of what the
conditions should be for finding oil. (Kindingstad and Hagemann, 2002, p.131)
25Halvorsen and Smith (1991)
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Nevertheless, Hotelling’s rule reveals one fact about petroleum production — the
continued presence of resource rents. Hotelling’s rule implies that the price of
oil is independent of the cost to extract it, and depends on the relative scarcity of
oil instead. Under these assumptions, Hotelling (1931) also finds that, assuming
that society and the producer has the same discount rate, the competitive producer
will extract the resource at society’s optimum rate. That also means that in a
competitive market, there should not be any attempts to conserve the resource
by the authorities. This is however an important issue, since modern economic
growth depends on the ability to substitute capital for labour, which again depends
on inanimate sources of energy.
Hotelling does identify one problem that deals with resources that go beyond the
boundaries of one property, which requires government intervention in order to
prevent wasteful extraction. For the modern petroleum business, this is only an
issue in the US to the author’s knowledge.26
The oil price itself is constrained by the cost of the use of alternative fuels — at
some price point, the use of other fuels than oil will be not only feasible but com-
mercially necessary. Figure 3.3 shows the implied price path, whereas Figure 3.4
shows the actual price development since 1997, with a Hotelling consistent trend
line added. The constraint also implies that when the price hits the ceiling im-
posed by alternatives, all recoverable resources should be exhausted. This price
ceiling is called the backstop price. The reason for this is that once the backstop
price is reached, it does not continue to increase. The price does not continue to
increase due to it being more profitable to exploit the alternatives once the back-
stop price is reached, which also implies that the alternative is a perfect substitute
for all uses of the resource.
26Outside the US, most jurisdictions, if not all, define subsoil resources as belonging to the state
acting as agent for the nation.
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Figure 3.3: Price path implied by Hotelling’s rule. Initial price 10, r=5% and
backstop price 20, calculated using Equation 3.2
It would therefore be more profitable to have sold the resource in the previous
period for the same price, and then investing it at the discount rate. If oil reaches
its terminal price, pT at time=T , then the present value at T of selling oil at T is:
PV =
pT ×QT
(1 + r)T
=
p0 × (1 + r)T ×QT
(1 + r)T
= p0 ×QT (3.3)
and the present value of selling oil at T+1 is:
PV =
pT ×QT+1
(1 + r)T+1
=
p0 × (1 + r)T ×QT+1
(1 + r)T+1
=
p0 ×QT+1
(1 + r)
(3.4)
This shows clearly that the optimal quantum at T +1 is 0, and that the production
rate should be adapted so that this can be achieved.
Nuclear, coal and hydro are the only viable options for substituting oil in electric-
ity generation presently. Other alternative fuels are too expensive or not available
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Figure 3.4: Actual spot price path for Ekofisk, 1997–2010.
in big enough quantities to be used. The most obvious alternatives to oil in vehi-
cle use are ethanol, biodiesel and petrol made from coal. These are all alternatives
that have been suggested in various countries. In Brazil, ethanol is the alternative
fuel of choice due to large sugar cane production and hitherto low costs.27 Ethanol
made from maize and petrol made from coal have been suggested in the US, and
the US is currently the world’s largest producer of automotive ethanol. US ethanol
depends on subsidies to remain competitive, and in terms of emissions of green-
house gases it is on par with using regular petrol. The US coal lobby has pressed
for the use of coal in petrol in order to make the country “energy independent”.
Due to its high cost, it has only ever been used in times of crisis, such as in Ger-
many during the Second World War. It is also significantly worse than petroleum
in terms of pollution.
27It would perhaps be disingenious to call a fuel alternative when it covers around 50 % of
demand in its market. It is however, the conventional notation.
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3.2.2 Taxation
One of the challenges for a country extracting this scarce resource is therefore
to manage the windfall profits that come as a result of this activity. Most coun-
tries’ legislation affirms that subsoil resources are part of the public patrimony.
From this it follows that the government should attempt to “capture” the resource
rents associated with petroleum extraction, as anything else would be a transfer of
wealth from the public to private interests. Furthermore, economic theory implies
that rents can be taxed at will, without affecting economic activity. This means
that from a practical perspective, government’s should raise as much as possible of
their tax revenue as taxes on rents, as this will minimise the dead weight loss im-
posed on society through tax wedges. A third reason that scarce natural resources
should be taxed is that extraction is not the same as production in principle. A
scarce natural resource can be considered part of a country’s capital stock, so any
sale of it would be a transformation of it from a natural resource into financial
capital.
Auctions
A common way of attempting to tax resource rents is through auctions. An auc-
tion has a couple of attractive properties for the governments in oil producing
countries. Firstly, it produces cash right away. Second, if the assumptions behind
Hotelling’s rule hold, an auction should yield a result in which the present value
of all the rent goes to the party auctioning off the right to extract oil. Under these
assumptions, the auction price of an oil field would be:
Auction price = −I +
T∑
t=1
pt ×Qt − C (Q, t)
(1 + rt)
t (3.5)
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I is the present value of the investment cost, which takes into account the capital
costs. The second term is the present value of the economic profit of the oil field.
The right hand side of the equation is equal to the net present value of the oil
field, which is the same as the present value of the resource rent. This simple
model does not take into account factors that complicate the picture considerably.
The investment cost is nearest in time, and therefore might be assumed to be the
most certain. Experience from for example the North Sea illustrates that different
companies and different geologists will assess the amount of recoverable oil and
the cost to extract it differently, which will significantly impact the price any given
oil company is willing to pay.
Information asymmetry can also benefit oil companies at the expense of govern-
ments. Generally, oil companies are better equipped to assess the potential of an
oil field. That implies that they have better estimates of the value of a field than
the government auctioning it off. By offering less than their assessed value, the
company may still receive some of the resource rent. Competition between oil
companies could mitigate this however.
Royalties
Royalties are simple to calculate, as they are simply a tax on gross revenue, per-
haps with a grace amount allowed for covering costs. A royalty tax would be
calculated as follows:
Royalty = p (t)× q (t)× r% (3.6)
where p is the price, q is the quantity and r is the royalty tax rate. This kind of
top line taxation has the potential to make projects that are profitable before tax
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unprofitable.
This makes the instrument unsuitable as the only tax on petroleum extraction.
From an economic efficiency perspective, the tax should therefore vary according
from field to field, in order to take into account differing costs and scale. This
would allow governments to tax much of the resource rent, while at the same time
allowing before-tax profitable projects to become profitable after tax.
Profit tax
A profit tax would seem to be better suited, as it allows for taxing only net of costs
income. By deducting costs from the revenue, a profit tax should allow projects
which are profitable before tax, to also be profitable after taxes.
The problem with this approach arises when looking at depreciation. Depreciation
is the tax-deductible allowance for paying for capital equipment in each year.
Capital outlays generally accrue prior to the start of a project, and the depreciation
allowance comes afterwards. Depending on the project length, the time from start
of project till start of production, the depreciation allowance in each year and the
discount rate, the difference between the present value of the capital outlays and
the present value of the depreciation may differ considerably. Table 3.2 illustrates,
using a project with 100 in capital outlays initially, and ten following years with
20 in revenue each year.
The project in Table 3.2 is marginally profitable before tax, and a 28 % tax on
the net present value would reduce it to 0.27. When the profit is taxed normally
however, the net present value is reduced to -13.4, 13.4 % of the original capital
expenditure. To put it in other words, in this scenario a project that creates value
on the margin would be value depleting for an investor due to taxes, even as the
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Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Capital investment -100
Revenue 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Depreciation 14 % 14 12 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 26
Tax 28 % 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 -2
Cash flow -100 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Cash flow - taxes -100 18 18 17 17 17 16 16 16 16 22
NPV 0.4
NPV of cash flow - taxes -13.4
Table 3.2: Effects of a profit tax. Based on a 28 % profit tax and 14 % diminishing
balance method of depreciation.
project is valuable for society.
The simplest way to deal with this problem would simply to allow the whole
depreciation at once, and tax only cash flows. This assumes that the company
has significant profits elsewhere against which the depreciation allowance can be
made. Otherwise, a tax credit must be devised or alternatively, the government
could pay companies in years with negative cash flows. The biggest advantage of
a tax on cash flow is that it is neutral, i.e. it doesn’t make unprofitable projects
profitable or vice versa. Any tax credit however, must be carried forward with
the same interest rate as the company uses in order to maintain the neutrality of
the tax. This information is normally not available to regulators, and even if the
company would reveal it, it is not certain that they would be completely honest.
The other alternative, that the government pays the company the negative tax in
years of negative cash flows, is to the author’s knowledge not the case anywhere.
The Resource Rent tax
Garnaut and Ross (1975) attempt to create a neutral tax called the resource rent tax
(RRT). They initially suggested it to create a mechanism for developing countries
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Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cap. inv. -100
Revenue 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Acc. profit -100 -95 -89 -83 -75 -66 -56 -45 -31 -16 1.52
Tax 28 % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.43
NPV accumulated profit 0.38
- after tax 0.27
Table 3.3: The Resource Rent tax. Using the same example as in Table 3.2, with
the same tax rate, but with the tax system as outlined in Garnaut and Ross (1975).
The discount rate has been set to 15 %.
to devise a tax system that would with relative simplicity enable authorities to
tax resource rents. By doing this, the same countries would not need to take part
in relatively risky equity investments through state owned enterprises in able to
capture the resource rents.
Simply put, it is a tax on cash flows, where negative taxes can be carried forward
with interest. The tax is levied on taxable income, which would be all revenues
subtracted all allowable deductions. Contrary to conventional profit taxes, deduc-
tions for depreciation and interest cost are not allowed, nor for other forms of
compensation for capital. Deductions for other payable taxes are allowed how-
ever. The investment cost is carried forward with interest. The authors argue
that authorities should use only one uniform interest rate for this tax, and not a
separate rate for each project or business, as this would complicate its implemen-
tation considerably. Interest rates could be varied according to the profitability
of a project, but this creates uncertainty. However, they also state that petroleum
and gas should have a separate, higher interest rate due to the high capital costs
in these areas. The tax itself is only paid after the investment cost is paid in its
entirety. Table 3.2 re-examines the example from Table 3.2, should give a picture
of how the tax could be.
The result of the RRT, provided that all companies face similar discount rates,
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is that all projects that are profitable pre-tax become profitable after tax as well.
This is not the case, since different projects will vary in risk level. The setting the
interest rates presents other problems too. If it is set too high, the government will
lose revenue it would otherwise receive as the loss carried forward will become too
big. If it is set too low, marginal projects will not be undertaken. The RRT should
allow governments to implement a final tax system that succeeds in capturing the
resource rent even with varying oil prices and revenues.
An alternative way of implementing the RRT would be to calculate the annuity,
which gives the same present value as the total, accumulated investment cost, and
use that as depreciation allowance. In the example in Table 3.2, that depreciation
would be:
Depreciation =
100
1/r − 1/(r × (1 + r)n) = 100/ar,n = 19.93 (3.7)
Using this depreciation instead of the diminishing balance of depreciation will
yield the same post-tax NPV as the straightforward RRT. Additionally, using this
depreciation schedule would give tax income sooner rather than later.
In practice the tax systems change with the circumstances. In Norway for exam-
ple, the petroleum tax regime has changed as the profitability of the oil industry
has varied. After the oil crises in the seventies, the tax system was revised up-
wards, i.e. taxes became higher, and after the oil price drop in 1986 taxes became
lower again. Another consideration to make is that the oil companies’ profits
must big enough to not only make each project profitable, but also able to cover
all other costs associated with exploration and development. There are bound to
be exploration costs in areas with no recoverable resources, and ultimately these
costs must be paid by profitable projects.
An issue that cannot be dealt with through the tax system per se is the issue of
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profit shifting through abusive transfer pricing. However, the nature of the RRT
means that the potential tax advantages to the use of internal debt disappear since
it doesn’t allow for interest deductions. It is not necessary to use the RRT for this
to be the case, in Italy for example, interest payments are not tax deductible.
3.2.3 Managing resource wealth
According to Hannesson (1998), the Norwegian petroleum taxation regime has
captured around 80 % of the rents associated with the industry, albeit resulting in
some inefficient allocation of resources, since “the tax code has been marred by
some built-in incentives for inefficiencies”.28
If the government is successful in capturing the resource rent, this should be man-
aged in some way. As noted earlier, extracting resources is more akin to shift-
ing capital investments from one kind of capital to another than normal indus-
trial or agricultural production. Most notable are perhaps Norway’s and Kuwait’s
petroleum funds, and Alaska’s tax refund. Norway’s petroleum fund converts the
petroleum resources into financial assets. The government receives special tax
revenue from the oil industry, and uses this money to buy stocks and bonds in for-
eign markets. The Norwegian Central bank manages these assets, and the fund is
expected to earn a real return of 4 % per year on average. This is also the nominal
limit for how much windfall tax revenue the government may spend in a given
year — 4 % of the value of the petroleum fund. Managing the wealth this way
allows authorities financially engineer Hotelling’s rule; if Hotelling’s rule truly
held, the value of the resources in the ground would be ever increasing at the dis-
count rate. The resources already extracted and invested conform to the rule. The
second advantage to this approach to wealth management is that the wealth should
28Hannesson (1998, p.114)
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last indefinitely, rather than being a short-term increase in tax revenue, followed
by a hangover in which the economy must be restructured, and painful spending
cuts and tax hikes must be implemented.
There are great differences between theory and reality — in theory, all resource
rents should be taxed, and it would not affect economic activity in any way. In
reality it is difficult to devise tax mechanisms which fully identify and capture the
resource rent.
Chapter 4
Challenges and opportunities
4.1 Brazil’s challenges
Even as production from the giants in the Campos basin came online, and the
Pro-Alcool programme progressed, Brazil continued to be dependent on foreign
oil.1 The oil price crash in 1985 made the substitution policy less palatable though.
Petroleum production increased slowly from 1985 until 1995, as did consumption.
Production increased marginally more than consumption though. In 1994, forty
years after the foundation of Petrobra´s, Brazil was still a long way from achieving
self-sufficiency.
In addition to failing in attaining self-sufficiency in production, Petrobra´s had
emerged as an inefficient producer. That’s not to say incompetent: the company
won the Offshore Technology Conference award twice for its development of the
Roncador field. However, the company had around 51,600 employees in 1992,
1In the 80s and 90s, ethanol fuelled cars had some inherent flaws, such as the lack of per-
formance and difficulty in starting them during cold weather (less than 15◦C). That made them
unsuitable in southern Brazil. Flex-fuel cars can avoid that problem entirely, and use whichever
fuel is cheaper or best suited for the weather.
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Figure 4.1: Brazilian crude production and consumption, ‘000 metric tons, 1960-
99. Source: Brazilian oil production, consumption, imports 1942-1999 on page IV
with a daily production of around 800,000 barrels. In 2000 the number of em-
ployees was down to around 34,320, whereas daily production had reached 1.2
million barrels.2 Public finances were not healthy, which previously had led to the
end of fiscal support for the Proa´lcool programme.
The 1994 Real plan had given the government credibility enough to be able to
finance its deficits through debt. However, during the following years, the need
for fiscal adjustment became ever more apparent. After having won support for a
constitutional amendment that would allow President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
to run for another term, the president turned to these issues. A crisis of confidence
in 1998 meant that the country had to turn to the IMF for support, and that helped
the president push measures that required more austerity from local governments
through Congress. That also meant that there was a need for more tax revenue.
The opening of other sectors in the economy had markedly improved labour pro-
2Number of employees is base on the number of Efetı´vos in Petrobra´s Holding.
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Figure 4.2: Daily production and number of employees in Petrobra´s, 1992-2007.
Production number in thousand barrels. Source: Number of employees and pro-
duction on page VI
ductivity, and in the period from 1991 to 1997, labour productivity had increased
8.7 % annually in the manufacturing sector.3 It made sense to open the petroleum
sector too, in order to increase productivity in the sector, increase production and
increase tax revenues. Figure 4.2 looks at the number of employees in Petrobra´s
from 1992 to 2007 versus the amount of petroleum produced, and shows that the
company’s productivity has increased remarkably.
Concurrent with the liberalisation of the petroleum industry came the part privati-
sation of Petrobra´s.
Even as production increased, the goal of self-sufficiency seemed far off. Norda˚s
et al. (2003) state that is unlikely that Brazil would achieve self-sufficiency soon.
However, in 2006, with two new platforms entering production, Brazil has started
exporting more petroleum and derivates than are imported.
3Baer (2008, p.144)
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This trend seems likely to continue. The pre-salt chamber has yielded two giant
fields, the two biggest in Brazilian history, and is still being explored. The Tupi
field should at maximum production yield around 1 million boe, more than 40
% of daily Brazilian production in 2007. Even before the pre-salt fields were
announced in 2007, Szklo et al. (2007) estimated that with 50 % probability, there
would be another 42 billion barrels of reserves added between 1996 and 2030.
That would mean an additional 30 billion barrels being discovered between 2004
and 2030. They estimate that Brazilian oil production would peak at 3.28 million
barrels per day, with production lasting until 2089. Due to the fact that Brazilian
offshore resources are relatively unexplored compared to more mature regions,
the authors argue that the lower probability estimate, of an additional 60 billion
barrels in the 1996-2030 period, may be more appropriate.
This new situation brings about a new set of challenges — the liberalisation pro-
cess helped bring about an end to import-dependency, now the question of how
to manage the windfall profits must be managed. As mentioned earlier, law no.
5938/09 would mandate changes in how the tax revenue is distributed. Figure 4.3
shows how inequitably the reserve are distributed, and highlights the necessity for
this change.
The deputy behind the proposed law has also expressed the need for regulating
how local authorities may spend the revenue. Otherwise, the fiscal constraint
imposed by the Fiscal Responsibility Act could disappear.4
Some Latin American policymakers have argued that the countries should delay
start-up in production of proven reserves, due to possible supply bottlenecks in
the future. They argue that the oil may prove much more valuable underground
4The Fiscal Responsibility act imposes restrictions on spending for local authorities which are
indebted to the Federal Government.
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Figure 4.3: Geographical distribution of proven reserves. (ANP, 2009a)
now and available for extraction in the future said bottlenecks appear.5 Szklo et al.
(2008) estimate that the value of a typical Brazilian oil field for an investor would
be reduced by 75 % if the production start is delayed by 10 years, and the value
of the tax income reduced by the same amount. By using USD 45 per barrel as
the baseline price for Brazilian heavy crude, which is sold at a discount compared
to Brent or WTI, they also estimate that the break-even price would be around
USD 101 per barrel for an investor to be indifferent to a ten year delay. Still,
the value of the tax income would be around 25 % lower than in the benchmark.
These estimates indicate that only in the case of a price increase of 8.5 % annually
would an oil company want to delay production, and the price increase would
have to be even steeper for it to be optimal for the government. This suggests that
resources discovered today should be extracted as soon as possible.
Large mineral resources inevitably put greater pressure on governments in han-
dling them. President Lula’s reaction to the discovery of large reserves in the
5Their concern in many ways mirror the concerns that Hotelling (1931) addressed.
CHAPTER 4. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 61
Pre-Salt fields was “God is Brazilian”. OPEC’s founding father would place oil
at the other end of the scale of deities; oil is “the devil’s excrement”.6 This is
the sentiment behind the term the resource curse. One would think that large en-
dowments of dear natural resources would be welcome and have a positive impact
on economic development. However, after controlling for other factors relevant
to economic development, resource rich countries tend to grow slower than re-
source poor countries. Sachs and Warner (1995) find that resource dependency
decreases growth in an economy, controlling for other factors. A one-standard-
deviation increase (16 %) in the resource intensity of the economy, measured as
primary-product share of exports, reduces the growth by one percentage point, per
year. That implies that two otherwise completely equal economies with differing
resource intensities, and where one has resource intensity equal to one standard
deviation more than the other, the latter will be double the size of the former in 70
years.
Corruption, civil wars and weak democratic institutions are also positively corre-
lated with the presence of large natural resource deposits.
Figure 4.4 shows how low the growth has been in some of the biggest petroleum
exporting countries. Saudi Arabia has negative growth of almost 40 % per capita
in the 25 years from 1980 through 2005. Venezuela’s has been around -14 %.
The world average, on the other hand was around 36 % for low income countries,
62 % for middle income countries and 51 % for high income countries in the
same time period. That means that none of the big exporters have done better
than the average, bar Norway, for the whole period. The governments’ ability to
capitalise on large oil revenues has been inexistent.7 Acar (2008) suggests that
6Useem (2003)
7It should be noted that this data comes from the World Bank, and the deflation method used
exaggerates GDP for earlier periods for oil exporters.
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Figure 4.4: Per capita GDP growth for seven of the top eight oil exporters per
2008. (Statistisk Sentralbyra˚; World Bank)
ethnic diversity makes the negative growth impact of natural resources worse.
The source of the resource curse can roughly be divided into three parts:
1. The risk of the Dutch disease
2. Increasing corruption and weak democracy
3. Increasing economic volatility
4.1.1 Dutch disease
When large gas deposits were found in the Netherlands, the country spent the
windfall on a generous welfare state. The end result was an erosion of traditional
industries because workers became uncompetitive. The disease manifests itself
by firstly inducing a real exchange rate appreciation due to large exports. This
makes imports more affordable for domestic consumers, at the expense of domes-
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tic producers of the same goods. Second, domestic production factors, labour and
capital, will be shifted towards the resource sector. The factor prices increase and
other sectors face rising costs. At its very extreme, the Dutch disease will lead to
a two-sector economy: resource extraction and a non-tradable sector.
In a neoclassical framework however, there is nothing inherently harmful about
the Dutch disease. The harm only arises when the sector in decline, normally the
domestic manufacturing sector, has special characteristics. These can be back-
ward and forward linkages or learning-by-doing effects. There can also be effi-
ciencies of scale. When this sector declines the allocation of resources and subse-
quent growth will be suboptimal.
Initially, this should not be a problem. Brazil has significant idle capacity in man-
ufacturing, and elsewhere in the economy. Unemployment is high, even amongst
skilled workers. The increase of tax revenues can also help in reforming the tax
structure, which is based on taxing what can be taxed. Simply put, the Brazilian
tax system punishes activity that cannot easily be done at a small scale, hidden
from tax authorities.
4.1.2 Increasing corruption and weak democracy
In Brazil, the distance of power is great to begin with. Politicians are generally
unaccountable, and corruption is assumed.8 “Parliamentary immunity is broadly
defined, making it possible to criminally suspect persons to seek, and get, pro-
tection from prosecution during term”.9 It is also difficult to convict persons of
8An exhaustive list would easily be longer than the thesis itself. Jose´ Sarney was reported to the
police for corruption during his tenure as president. His son, who manages the Sarney clans assets,
is accused of numerous crimes, and of trying to censure one of Brazil’s biggest daily newspapers.
He is also accused for ”ideological falsity”, which is an excellently named charge for a politician’s
son. Fernando Collor was impeached for alleged irregularities in his campaign.
9Abramo and Speck (2001)
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higher social strata, there is little disincentive to corruption in the civil service and
“The Judiciary inefficiency reinforces impunity and is perceived as a stimulus to
corruption”.10
According to Kaufmann and Wei (2000), some economists have argued that cor-
ruption offers a way around bureaucratic processes, or at least a way to speed them
up by putting a price on them. It should also make sure the most efficient firms
are awarded projects, since they would have the biggest profits to finance bribes.
However, bribes and corruption might give public servants an incentive to work
slower in the absence of bribes, and also increase regulatory harassment.11 There
is also no clear venue for contract enforcement. Since the contract itself is illicit,
there is no guarantee that the public official will act in the promised way and one
cannot sue for breach of contract.
Leite and Weidmann (1999) find that the presence of natural resources in the form
of fuels and ores, i.e. petroleum, coal, iron and other minerals, has a significant,
adverse effect on the level of corruption in the economy. Agricultural and food
resources do not present the same tendencies; in fact these natural resources are
negatively correlated with corruption according to the same article. The authors
argue that capital intensive industries present better opportunities for corruption
than labour intensive industries. They also find that higher levels of corruption
cause lower long-run growth.
Increased reliance on revenues from resources rather than taxes from citizens tend
to weaken democratic structures in a country. This is not only the case in new
democracies; in the US, states with greater reliance on natural resources tend to
have less political competition — incumbents hold on to power longer and the
10Abramo and Speck (2001)
11Kaufmann and Wei (2000) find that not only does bribery not lower regulatory harassment by
public officials; it’s likely it actually increases it.
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states become more hegemonic.12
FIESP, the Sao Paulo Federation of Industry, has complained that the tax system
is incredibly opaque, and makes it hard for citizens to judge how much they pay
in and hold politicians accountable. This is in great part due to indirect rather than
direct taxation. Holding politicians accountable is likely to be more difficult as
large and increasing tax revenues arrive.
Brazil will have to preserve democratic structures, which is hard in already far
more entrenched democracies. The resource wealth will tend to exacerbate clien-
telist tendencies present, especially in the Northeast.
4.1.3 Increasing economic volatility
Larger dependency on natural resources makes countries more exposed to price
changes in the resources they are dependent on. The history of Brazil itself is an
example of this, the boom and bust cycles following dependence on different crops
led to the rise and fall of both Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, as well as the coffee
farmers in Sao Paulo. The collapse of coffee prices during the Great Depression
led to a recession in Brazil, which again was partly responsible for the 1930 coup.
The petroleum sector makes up an ever increasing part of the economy, though
the extraction business was responsible for only 2.8 % of GDP in 2003.13 This
means that its impact on the economy relatively small still. Increased reliance on
primary exports may still make the country more volatile economically.
12Goldberg et al. (2005)
13ANP (2005)
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4.2 Statoil’s challenges
Norwegian oil production peaked in 2000, when production volume was 181 mil-
lion m3. Increasing gas production maintained an increase in total oil equivalent
production. However, the increase in gas production has not kept up with the de-
crease in oil production, and overall the production volume in terms of million
cubic metres of oil equivalents has been slightly decreasing since 2004. In com-
parison to oil, gas presents disadvantages in that it requires more costly infrastruc-
ture investments to facilitate transportation, and the market for gas is fragmented.
I.e., most gas is consumed close to the place of extraction. According to Oljedi-
rektoratet (2009), around 50 % of total recoverable reserves have been sold, some
of which is conditional on opportunities for increased recovery rates. It is further
estimated that there are 3400 million cubic metres of undiscovered resources.
Further discoveries are uncertain, and new areas may not be readily available
for extraction, either due to physical or political conditions. There is much de-
bate whether areas outside Lofoten and Vestera˚len in Northern Norway should be
opened for exploration for instance. Due to its status as one of the most important
fisheries in the world, environmentalists are concerned about the effects of a pos-
sible oil spill. The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico will perhaps also have long term
effects on the public opinion about this.
Even so, estimates put the amount of recoverable reserves in this region at approx-
imately 1.2 billion barrels of oil equivalents, or 202 million cubic metres. That is
approximately the same as average yearly production in Norway from 1996 and
onwards. (See Figure 4.5)
The Norwegian Continental Shelf accounts for around 75 % of Statoil’s oil and
gas production, and Statoil in turn acts as operator for 75 % of all oil and gas
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Figure 4.5: Norwegian oil and gas production, 1971-2009. Production in million
cubic metres. (Oljedirektoratet, 2010)
extracted in Norway.14
The decline on the Norwegian continental shelf presents a problem or a challenge
for Statoil. The main source of revenues is declining, and will eventually disap-
pear. Statoil then has two choices — gradually decline and eventually disappear
jointly with the Norwegian oil production, or continue operations elsewhere. If
Statoil had continued to be only the Norwegian government’s industrial instru-
ment in the North Sea, the conclusion might have been easier to reach. Ceasing
operations would be a more viable option if that were the case. This is what will
happen to the SDFI. The increasing reliance on gas presents another problem for
the Norwegian government — the prices of gas in Europe has historically been
lower than for petroleum when compared at price per energy output.
As Statoil is run as a commercial company, the most obvious path forward would
be to continue business as long as profitable business opportunities exist. In prac-
14Statoil (2009)
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tice, this is what has been done, and even before the privatisation Statoil had sub-
stantial investments in other countries. Today, Statoil is present in 40 countries in
all continents but Oceania.
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4.3 Opportunities and challenges together
4.3.1 What’s in it for Statoil?
The look for new business ventures should go where Statoil has some inher-
ent advantages. Statoil is the world’s second biggest deep water operator, after
Petrobra´s. A large portion of the oil Statoil extracts comes from deep water oil
fields, most of that on the Norwegian continental shelf. Statoil was operator for
the development phase of the Ormen Lange gas field for instance. Furthermore,
the company has ongoing relations with local subcontractors that have experience
in the same conditions.
Statoil is a big deep water operator, and has experience in rough waters. That
makes Brazil a good fit tor the company’s future, since there are large oil reserves
in Brazil. Statoil also owns a number of production and exploration licenses in
the country.
Statoil’s FDI
Statoil’s FDI in Brazil is resource seeking FDI. Furthermore, most of the oil is
beneath deep water, which is very costly. Why would Statoil choose FDI over
outsourcing? Analysing the FDI decision through the OLI-framework can give an
indication for the reasons.
Ownership advantages Statoil’s ownership advantages are related to its ability
to organise its resources more efficiently than others, and its experience in off-
shore fields. Long experience has built up human capital in the company, and an
organisational culture that is capable of operating efficiently in this environment.
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Localisation advantage Since this is resource seeking FDI, the localisation ad-
vantage is inherent to the business. Still, there are other oil rich places in the
world. Brazil presents a scenario which is familiar for Statoil, and therefore a
good localisation.
Internalisation advantages The main internalisation advantage is gaining the
resource rent, at least the part that is not paid to the government in taxes. It is
ironic that Norway, through its majority ownership in Statoil, effectively receives
money from Brazil. However, it is important to distinguish between resource
rent and Ricardian rent, which is “lowest cost” or “being-more-efficient” rent.
If the Brazilian government fails to capture the resource rent through taxation,
Statoil would receive part of the public patrimony. If more equitable distribution
of income is desirable, this is questionable. However if Statoil is to operate along
commercial guidelines, it is inevitable.
Ricardian rents is a different matter, however. If Statoil is in fact more efficient
than other competing operators, at least part of that efficiency profit would go into
Statoil’s pockets. This follows from the auction model, if Statoil is well informed
about its competitors capabilities.15
Another internalisation advantage is continued ownership over proprietary extrac-
tion processes that might give Ricardian rents. Outsourcing either means forego-
ing Ricardian rents or enabling someone else to capture the same elsewhere, and
losing this advantage in the future. Contractual incompleteness means that some-
one might steal proprietary techniques. If this knowledge is dissipated throughout
the industry, the rent would disappear, as everyone would become at least as ca-
15The auction price they would bid, if well informed about their competitors, would be an
amount high enough to stave off competition, but low enough to allow them to keep some of the
rent.
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pable as Statoil and all associated rents for Statoil would be resource rents.
What advantages does Statoil have in Brazil?
In Brazil, Statoil should have a couple of advantages not shared by many other oil
companies. First and foremost, Statoil comes from Norway, which has had rela-
tively good experiences with the oil industry. Statoil has been Norway’s industrial
instrument, and has succeeded in building a domestic, competitive oil industry.
In addition, Norway has taxed the oil industry well, in that most of the resource
rents have accrued to the government. The Norwegian state has also been able to
share the benefits relatively equally. Since the company is partly state owned, that
should reflect well on it. The political culture in Brazil means that Statoil is seen
as a part of the Norwegian government, not a discrete entity.
The Norwegian state has poured lots of money into preserving the rainforest which
would at least shed a positive light on Norwegian companies, especially compa-
nies closely associated with the government. The Norwegian government will
invest up to USD 1 billion to preserve Brazilian rain forests until 2015, depending
on the project’s success. According to a source in the Norwegian Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, effects for Norwegian businesses in the country were not con-
sidered when deciding on the project. However, according to the same source,
“Norwegian-Brazilian cooperation has a positive spill-over effect on Norwegian
business”.16
Statoil has used the Peregrino field to showcase its knowhow in heavy oil in Brazil.
The Peregrino field is relatively typical for the Campos Basin, with heavy oil and
reserves of around 300–600 million barrels. Norsk Hydro bought 50 % of the
16Høsøien (2008, p.46)
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license for around 2.3 billion NOK in 2007, and Statoil bought the rest in 2008.
Chinese SOEs Cnooc and Sinochem have since bid 3 billion USD for a 40 %
share, which means that the value of the entire field is around 48 billion NOK.17
4.3.2 What’s in it for Brazil?
Brazil has large discovered, as well as large probable reserves of oil on deep wa-
ters. The country wants to extract this oil, to gain tax income from these re-
sources. Statoil can play a role in extracting the resources, since it is second only
to Petrobra´s in deep water extraction.
There is also a need to avoid the negative factors associated with the petroleum
industry. Corruption is probably the biggest pitfall for Brazil; the scale and scope
is still not big enough the bring on the Dutch disease or increase the economic
volatility much.18
Norway is the country that is least negatively affected by petroleum production,
of the big exporters. Figure 4.4 shows how the other big oil producers have done
economically. Statoil being an integral part of this development in Norway might
be helpful to achieve the same thing in Brazil.
However, Larsen (2008) notes that the then two Norwegian oil companies, Norsk
Hydro and Statoil had worse environmental records in Angola than in Norway.
It is therefore not given that Statoil’s relatively positive role for Norway will be
immediately transplanted to Brazil. Statoil does for example maintain an internal
bank in Belgium, which according to Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) is a tax
haven. 19
17Dagens Næringsliv (2010). 1USD = 6.40NOK
18Whether increased dependance on oil will increase economic volatility is uncertain. It de-
pends largely on the business’ correlation with the rest of the economy.
19As noted in section 3.1.2, internal banks can be used to reduce the tax liability. The Benelux
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If Brazil is to benefit more from Statoil’s involvement than any other, privately
held company, it is imperative that its status as a SOE makes it different. Cases
such as that in Nigeria implies that this is not always the case.20
There is nothing that indicates that Statoil is more corrupt than other Norwegian
companies, but there are no indications that the company will be less corrupt than
other Norwegian companies. According to Muir and Saba (1995), Statoil was
amongst the best run SOEs in the world.
Ultimately, Brazil’s gains from the newfound oil wealth depends on its author-
ities ability to regulate and tax the industry appropriately. This depends on the
institutional quality of the country, and cannot easily be changed by an external
company such as Statoil. The company, together with the Norwegian government,
may present a manner of doing this in a succesful manner.
The changes made in the last 15 years, and the results obtained indicates that the
country is on the right track. The fact that the country has departed from the
more classical Latin American strong-man regimes has surely been helpful. The
consensus-building and associated continuity imposed by democracy means that
for foreign investors, there is more stability, and the political risk decreases. If the
country is to be successful in taxing and regulating the oil industry, this trend must
continue. It is a paradox that the very industry may counter this very development.
As the pre-salt fields are discovered and developed, and the oil wealth flows in,
the authorities will hopefully be prepared to handle the flux of money, and have
a plan for investing it in the future. Anything else would be a shame, but for the
eternal Land of the Future, not completely unexpected.
countries and Ireland act as conduit countries for German FDI, with money flowing in and out to
lower the effective tax rate.
20Statoil has been sued for breach of contract in Nigeria, due to not paying fees due to Dr.
John Abebe, brother-in-law of a former President, after he had brokered a deal which gave Statoil
ownership interests in three deepwater oil blocks. (TradingMarkets.com, 2010)
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Appendices
I
II
List of acronyms
ANP — Ageˆncia Nactional do Petroleo, Gas Natural e Biocombustiveis. Regula-
tory agency responsible for petroleum, natural gas and biofuels.
CNP — Conselho Nacional de Petroleo. National Petroleum council, regulatory
agency. Precursor to ANP.
DASP — Departamento Administrativo do Servic¸o Pu´blico. Principally respon-
sible for the federal budget, and finding ways to improve public services.
MNE — Multinational Enterprise
PTB — Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro. Brazilian Worker’s Party.
RRT — Resource Rent tax. See section 3.2.2
SDFI — The State’s Direct Financial Interest. The Norwegian state’s direct hold-
ings on the Norwegian continental shelf.
SOE — State owned Enterprise
YPF — Yacimientos Petrolı´feros Fiscales. Argentinean state owned oil company.
III
Map of Brazil
Source:
Geographyguide
IV
Brazilian oil production, consumption, imports 1942-
1999
All numbers in thousand metric tons
Year Production (a) Imports (b) Total consumption (c) Self-sufficiency (a/c)
1942 4 11 15 0.266666667
1943 6 37 43 0.139534884
1944 8 18 26 0.307692308
1945 10 10 20 0.5
1946 9 37 46 0.195652174
1947 13 8.7 21.7 0.599078341
1948 19 0 — —
1949 14 0 — —
1950 44 59 103 0.427184466
1951 90 20 110 0.818181818
1952 98 18 116 0.844827586
1953 12 30 42 0.285714286
1954 130 142 272 0.477941176
1955 265 3513 3778 0.070142933
1956 530 4889 5419 0.097804023
1957 1321 4846 6167 0.214204638
1958 2473 5652 8125 0.304369231
1959 3083 5742 8825 0.349348442
1960 3870 5684 8966 0.431630605
1961 4549 7549 12098 0.376012564
1962 4367 9961 14328 0.304787828
1963 4669 10375 15044 0.310356288
1964 4353 10803 15156 0.287212985
1965 4488 10247 14735 0.30458093
1966 5548 11322 16870 0.328867813
1967 7079 10559 17638 0.401349359
1968 7823 12525 20348 0.384460389
1969 8360 14910 23270 0.359260851
1970 7980 17366 25248 0.316064639
1971 8303 19864 27470 0.302257008
1972 8138 25257 32342 0.251623276
1973 8276 34879 42194 0.196141632
Continued on next page. . .
VYear Production (a) Imports (b) Total consumption (c) Self-sufficiency (a/c)
1974 8617 34831 42828 0.201200149
1975 8352 35730 43005 0.194209976
1976 8121 40996 46267 0.175524672
1977 7810 40592 47652 0.163896584
1978 7788 44750 52652 0.147914609
1979 8042 50041 54983 0.146263391
1980 8840 43333 52114 0.169628123
1981 10365 42211 51860 0.199865021
1982 12984 39180 51691 0.251184926
1983 16595 36438 52982 0.313219584
1984 23269 32538 55807 0.416954862
1985 27492 27422 54914 0.50063736
1986 28784 29871 58655 0.490733953
1987 28463 30643 59106 0.481558556
1988 27853 31739 59405 0.468866257
1989 29845 29666 60068 0.496853566
1990 31614 28617 58721 0.53837639
1991 31229 26361 57657 0.541634147
1992 31569 26566 59130 0.533891426
1993 32252 25477 59806 0.539276996
1994 33804 27957 61812 0.5468841
1995 34907 25353 62251 0.560746012
1996 39401 28594 67257 0.585827498
1997 42777 29207 71570 0.597694565
1998 49570 27973 77313 0.64115996
1999 55252 24233 79737 0.692928001
For some earlier years, detailed consumption numbers where missing. For those
years, production and imports together have been used. The measurement error
should be neglible. The import numbers for 1948 and 1949 are obviously wrong,
and a proper estimate for total consumption is not available.
Sources:
UNSD (1999, 1995, 1992, 1989, 1985, 1982); Department of International Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs (1979); Mitchell (1993)
VI
Number of employees and production
Year Efetı´vos Daily production
(’000 barrels)
1992 51638 800
1993 51228 800
1994 50295 820
1995 46226 840
1996 43468 960
1997 41173 1000
1998 38225 1238
1999 35891 1404
2000 34320 1566
2001 32809 1636
2002 34520 1810
2003 36363 2036
2004 39091 2020
2005 40541 2217
2006 47955 2298
2007 50207 2300
Sources:
Petrobra´s (1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007)
The number of efetı´vos is for Petrobra´s Holding for each year. Given the nature of
the labour system in Brazil, efetı´vo means something akin to worker with tenure.
Temporary workers are not part of the numbers, and that may underestimate the
number of employees substantially. The leftward swing after Lula’s inauguration
may have caused less temporary workers and more efetı´vos, meaning that the time
series may not be completely internally comparable. Within the constraints of this
thesis it is the best estimate I have however.
